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WITTGENSTEIN ON THE FOUNDATIONS
OF LANGUAGE: A NON-FOUNDATIONAL
NARRATION
Enakshi Mitra
For later Wittgenstein, language cannot be founded upon
something more primordial than language itself, something
that has a definite origin and boundary that marks it off and
yet has a magical power of pulling the entire corpus of
language to come to rest on it. None of the usually proposed
foundations ñ universals, physical ostension, mental images,
verbal rules, nervous excitements, brain-patterns, or even
forms of life, can be claimed to have a pre-linguistic or extra-
linguistic character that can serve as the desired origin and
justification of language. Later Wittgensteinís engagement
with the foundations of language is an exercise of dissolving
this putative cleavage, of weaving the foundation and the
founded into an indissoluble whole. In this paper we have
tried to catch some glimpses of this enormous philosophical
labour carried out by him - the labour of flattening out the
hidden depths of language (proposed by classical
philosophers) into an open expanse ñ into an unimaginably
rich and complex plethora of uses, ever indeterminate and
ever incomplete.1
We need to start with his account of concept formation
and family resemblances as an effective strategy to grapple
with this vexed program of foundationalism. To say the least,
it is an explicit attack on the classical foundations of language
and conception ñ the eternal and timeless universals of Plato
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and Aristotle, and Merkmal definitions cased in necessary
and sufficient conditions, supposedly shared by all the
defined items. Wittgenstein often describes the process of
concept-formation in terms of fibers ëoverlapping and
crisscrossingí, ëcommon featuresí that ëappearí and ëdrop
outí, features that he characterises as ëfamily-resemblancesí.
(PI 66, 67) The account is often prone to certain
misinterpretations, its deeper implications not always
effectively worked out. We shall, however, consciously start
with a minimalist interpretation of the notion of family
resemblance and the ìfibre-on-fibreî account of concepts.
Ironically this leaves us with a multiplicity of temporary and
short-ranged features which might be called local
foundations in lieu of classical ëuniversalsí. This would retain
the overworn dichotomy between particulars and properties,
and perhaps also a cumbrous version of the Augustinian
model of concept-formation, the model that Wittgenstein
has rejected both in detail and in principle. In fine, the
theory of concept-formation that apparently emerges from
Wittgensteinís texts will turn out to be nothing but an
uninspiring dilution of the classical foundationalism.
We shall attempt to work our way out of this impasse,
through an extensive critique of the Augustinian model.
We shall have to focus particularly on the dubious
transparency of ostensive and verbal definition and the false
dichotomy between simple and complex ñ the myths that
forge a false cleavage between language and reality ( i.e.,
the foundation and the founded), ultimately claiming to
bridge the two in an isomorphic relation. We hope to end
this paper with a rough idea of Wittgensteinís vision of
language, as to how the foundational mechanisms of
ostension, rules, descriptions on the one hand and the
external reality on the other penetrate into each other into
an open and endless flow of uses.
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The minimalist interpretation of family-resemblances
It is both customary and convenient to start with the concept
of games, an ingenious choice to dissipate our notion of a
fixed and unitary essence lying beneath the usage of all
general words. Wittgenstein cites the examples of board-
games, card-games, ball-games and Olympic games. The
features we consider important in the board-games - like
throwing dice, moving counters on the board - manifestly
drop out in the card-games and others appear. These again
start dropping out in ball-games. Obviously we have to look
for certain other commonalties of apparently a broader range
ñ like amusement, competition, winning and losing, skill
and luck. Bull-fight and boxing often involving bloodshed
and casualties do not satisfy the amusement condition.
Moreover, the kind of amusement we find in chess drops
out from noughts and crosses; another fiber ñ let it be called
ëamusementí again - reappears, which will again drop out
from the next kind of game we come across. Winning and
losing ñ the element of competition (an apparently invariable
feature in all games) - do not feature in patience.
Considering the fact that skill in chess is so different from
skill in tennis, we cannot posit skill as a recurring feature of
all games. Moreover, skill in a very general sense is altogether
dropped out from games like ring-a-ring-a roses. ë[W]e see
a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities
of detailí. (PI 66)
In PI 67 Wittgenstein further observes: ëAnd we extend
our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fiber
on fibre. And the strength of the fibre does not reside in
the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length,
but in the overlapping of many fibresí.
The talk of overlapping fibre on fibre naturally leads to
the following picture most commonly used by Wittgensteinís
commentators.
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ABC CDE DEF FGH
g1 g2 g3 g4
Fig. 1
(Using small ëgí for games and capital letters for the overlapping
features like ëamusementí, ëwinning and losingí, ëskill in chessí, ëskill
in tennisí etc.)
The particulars that we call ëgameí do not even share a
common necessary condition, not to speak of a common
sufficient condition. Nor can we construct a subset from the
given set of overlapping features and claim it to be the
necessary and sufficient conditions of any game whatsoever.
The fibres go on overlapping in an ever-expanding horizontal
line, never converging to a single point.
There is also no reason to suppose that all persons start
with the same set of fibres, with exactly the same sets
mediating between in the same order. Different language-
users would spin concepts in different lines like ñ
HFA AEB BCG CGD
g1 g2 g3 g4
Fig. 2
and also in many other conceivably alternative tracks.
Wittgenstein has not only challenged the notion of a
unitary essence but also of a fixed essence. The process of old
fibres disappearing and new fibres cropping up is one of
continuous expansion, and not a permutation and
combination of a pre-given finite set.
Wittgenstein describes these overlapping features or
fibres as ëfamily-resemblancesí. (PI 67) Large families where
we can survey a number of siblings and cousins, their parents,
grandparents and their offsprings together, clearly exhibit
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how features like build, shape of the eyes and nose, structure
of the jaws, curve of the lips, colour of the eyes, gait,
temperament, etc., overlap and crisscross in the same way.
None of the above features at any point can be attributed to
all the members in common. Thus though starting with the
instance of game, Wittgenstein privileges the case of family
as well, as an exemplary case to understand how other
concepts, i.e., concepts other than game too, are spun
through overlapping and crisscrossing fibres, and not on the
basis of a putative set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
And a family expands for ever, its new members continually
being born, and old members passing away, generating new
features to be added to the network and old features dying
out.
Since Wittgenstein warns us not to think that there must
be a singular identity behind all uses of general words and
instead wants us to ëlook and seeí, we cannot now just stop
with two examples ñ we have to examine some simple and
familiar concepts, specially those which unlike ëgameí, and
ëfamilyí, do seem to have an essence in common.
To take the example of ëgoldí ñ a neat, scientific concept,
dressed up in a complete set of necessary and sufficient
conditions.2 A definite spectral line, a certain atomic number
(79), a certain atomic weight, a characteristic odour, a
certain degree of malleability, a certain melting point, and
entering into certain chemical combinations and not others.
Suppose something occurred with the same atomic number
but was not yellow but purple, not malleable, had a different
melting point, and produced a different series of spectral
lines. Many chemists who take the atomic number itself to
be the sole defining characteristic still call it gold. Others
who consider each of the above conditions to be necessary
cannot call it by the same name ñ a position rather dubious
in view of the fact that an isotope has a different weight
from that normally characterising the element, yet chemists
call it ëXí (X, but an isotope of X), as long as it has other
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characteristics of X. And we can stretch our imagination a
little further to the emergence of different metals, each
with a different set of ëgoldishí fibers, overlapping and
crisscrossing, but not a single fiber commonly running
through all of them. Conceived in this way one cannot rule
out the possibility of newer and newer samples of gold with
newer and newer fibers, hitherto unrecorded. This is one
reason why one cannot posit a ëdisjunctive propertyí shared
in common by all particulars of the same name ñ whatever
fibers you may have incorporated in that disjunctive set, you
cannot ever put a last member. On the other hand, speaking
of such common properties - a disjunctive set with an
indefinite number of elements ñ is only ëplaying with wordsí.
ëOne might just as well say: ìSomething runs through the
whole thread ñ namely the continuous overlapping of those
fibersîí. (PI 67) These are the kinds of philosophical
sophistries that we find parodied in nonsense prose like Alice
in Wonderland, where the King, hearing that Alice knew
nothing whatever about a theft, noted down ëNothing
Whateverí as a very important evidence.3
With a little stretch of imagination we can even dispense
with a common starting point ñ a minimal necessary
condition of something being a sample of gold ñ viz. itís
maintaining a definite size at a given time, its availability to
stable and continued perception etc. Such conjectures are
designed not to evoke a sense of amusement or perverse
excitement, but to break through a certain fetishised notion
of conception, understanding and communication. To have
a concept (that is, to identify a group of particulars as falling
under it), or to understand the meaning of the relevant
term, or to communicate that meaning to others, we need
not and cannot have a precise set of defining characteristics
ready at hand, that once for all sets the mind at rest. Besides,
redefining a term ëfor a special purposeí (PI 69) virtually
puts the word out of circulation, i.e., out of general use,
leaving a few exceptional circumstances. Suppose we want
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to re-define the length of the corridor in our university
department (which we know to be X meters), in terms of
how many paces it takes to walk through. For this ëspecial
purposeí we define one pace as 75 centimeters and match
up the two definitions as X meters = Y paces (PI 69). But
apart from serving this very special purpose it cannot be made
to put an absurd demand on everybodyís pace to measure
up exactly to 75 centimeters every time they walk, thus
making the very concepts of ëpaceí and ëwalkí unusable.
Delimiting, loosening, adding or dropping fibres,
shuffling or reshuffling, whether conscious or unconscious,
idiosyncratic or pragmatic, has a significant sociological
dimension4. This becomes specially palpable when a person
or a particular community, under the influence of specific
needs, interests, or of a particular history, culture, or
physiology, may identify same objects (i.e., what other people
call ësameí object) under different concept. Secondly, he /
they can identify ëdifferentí objects (i.e., what other people
call ìdifferentî objects) under the ësameí concept.
A very interesting example given by Bambrough may
profitably be used to clarify these points. He asks us to imagine
a tribe ñ the ëSouth Sea Islandersí, whose island is thickly
clad with a rich variety of trees, and for whom trees are of
greatest importance in their life and work5. Their ways of
classifying trees do not conform to the botanistsí principle
of classification. They do not classify trees as orange trees,
date-palms or cedars, but as ëhouse-building treesí, ëboat-
building treesí, or in terms of their height, thickness, or
maturity ñ features that are specially relevant to the
necessities of their life. Here of course as in all other cases,
the botanist identification of, say, ëmango treeí and the
islanderís classification of ëboat-building treesí work, not with
a unitary essence, but with overlapping fibres. But while the
botanistsí fibers of classification either go undetected, or
are deemed irrelevant by the islanders, similar charges will
apply to us or the botanist. The South-sea islander assimilates
172 ENAKSHI MITRA
the same trees (say mango) under different concepts; say
one mango tree he calls a boat-building tree, another mango
tree he classifies under house-building trees, and so on. On
the other hand, he also assimilates different trees (mango,
pine, and oak) under the same concept of a boat-building
tree. At any point of time, an existing network of concepts is
already invaded, or rather made intricate, by more and more
tracks and features.
It should be clear that the fibers do not only move
through a horizontal track of time, jumping from tree1 to
tree2 , from preceding moments to successive ones. There
is, as already stated, a complicated network of fibres that
both overlap and crisscross, a network that has no point of
origin, where games cannot be numbered in an ordinal series
of 1, 2, 3, . . . , and each individual at any moment is a cross-
section of many fibres simultaneously crossing over each
other. The following figure may be taken as a rough
indication of what this network is like and how it expands:
Fig. 3
Here again we take ëgí for individual games, houses or trees (this time
without being numbered); A, B, C as features; and the dotted lines as some
of the possible modes of expansion.
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We do not always have to imagine a remote island with a
remote way of life to appreciate the diverse modes of concept
formation. Modern society with its widely ramified
professions, technologies, and industries, offer ample
examples on the issue. Animals are divided in one way by
the zoologist, another by fur-industry, still in another way by
the leather-industry. Houses are identified in one way by
the architect, in another way by the gas-inspector, and in
still another by the fire-department.
We may now concentrate on more unfamiliar examples
cited by Wittgenstein himself on different modes of concept
formation. In RFM V 42, he imagines a person or a group of
persons who observe a surface only as coloured red, white,
and blue, and does not observe that it is also red. A kind of
colour-adjectives were used for things that are partially red,
partially blue, and partially white ñ they are said to be ëbuí.
And someone can be trained to observe that it is ëbuí, and
not to observe whether it is also red, blue or white. Such a
man could only report ëbuí and ënon-buí. Here Wittgenstein
invites us to imagine that the ëobservation happens by means
of a psychological sieve, which for example only lets through
the fact that the surface is blue-white-red (the French
tricolour) or that it is notí. Here the person obviously misses
out the distinction between separate fibres, he assimilate
the three distinct colours, red, white, and blue under one
colour concept ñ ëbuí; he obfuscates the distinction between
the other colours, and calls each of them as ënon-buí. Perhaps
Wittgenstein is suggesting that the person is thoroughly
indoctrinated in a single and indissoluble ideal of French
revolution and assimilates red, white and blue under a single
concept, while all other colours fall out as irrelevant. The
situation is somewhat like the South sea islanders who
considered three different kinds of trees ñ mango, pine,
and cedar - to be the same. They assimilate the separate
fibres like the shape of the trunk, or the quality of the wood
under the same fibre, say ëmaturityí, and identify the three
different trees under the same class-name.
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It is time to take a pause and reflect a bit on this foregoing
account with its rather excess of examples. Several questions
prop up at this juncture. (a) Are these fibres ëcommon
featuresí of a different status ñ temporary and of a smaller
range, unlike the eternal and ubiquitous universals of the
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy? Unfortunately on a few
occasions, Wittgensteinís phrases do provide some fuel for
this kind of interpretation. ëNow pass to card games... many
common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass
next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much
is lostí. (PI 66, italics mine). The metaphor of physical
overlapping of one fibre on another, transferred to the
context of concept formation (PI 67) may also have some
misleading suggestions. On a fragmentary reading of
Wittgensteinís texts the notorious ontology of common
features, over and above the individuals and identically shared
by them, remains unscathed. (b) Is Wittgenstein putting
forth a sociological or anthropological theory of language
whereby people are socially determined to hold particular
sets of beliefs, by selecting / rejecting, permuting/
combining from a repertoire of real features given out there?
To put it more precisely, Wittgensteinís account might give
the impression that there are bare featureless identities in
the shape of either bare particulars or bare universals that
can only be named, and these form the primordial and pre-
social basis of all alternative modes of description. I.e. when
one conceives a chair or a tree under several alternative
modes one is only combining these bare identities in various
combinations.6 A proper appreciation of Wittgensteinís view
would need us to nullify each of these questions.
The Augustinian model
This myth of detachable common identities, whether eternal
or temporary, one or many, all-pervasive or restricted, is
appended with another myth ñ the Augustinian model in
which all language, all signs are supposed to work. According
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to this model or theory each sign reaches out to its
corresponding object in reality, which is its reference, and
stamps a label on it. Laying out the basic points of the theory
we shall find that most classical theories of language adhere
to it in principle, in spite of their internal differences7:
(a) Linguistic expressions can be roughly divided into
proper names and common-names (descriptions).
Proper names pick out unique individuals, common
names like ëtableí pick out definite properties like
tablehood etc. from among other properties. While for
Plato, the word ëTableí picks out an Ideal Tablehood
from the third realm, for Aristotle it refers to a property
immanent in all individual tables in the mundane world.
(b) While for Russell proper names pick out bare particulars
and universals directly, for Frege they need the mediation
of a definite property uniquely belonging to that
individual, for reaching out to their corresponding
reference.8
(c) For the British empiricists too the sign ëtableí would
either be the name of an abstract mental image or a
logically abstractable essence, or on the most non-
committal Nominalist version, it would still name ñ not a
single individual, but a single group of individuals
arbitrarily selected, which professedly do not share any
common characteristics.
(d)Words pin down their meanings either directly, or
through physical ostension, mental image, silent speech,
or verbal rules phrased in definite descriptions.
The crux of the Augustinian model that Wittgenstein seeks
to dismiss is the mutual externality of language and reality ñ
an idea which all the above schools of philosophy share in
common. If one wishes to graft the model into a sociological
theory of language, the theory would roughly come to this:
All levels of identification ñ whether it is identifying a bare
particular or a bare property are pre-social; it is at the level
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of permuting/ combining, selecting/ rejecting from the real
features that the process of socio-cultural conditioning comes
into play.
Wittgensteinís Critique of the Augustinian model
A short exposition of Wittgensteinís reactions to the
supposed sanctity of verbal rules will be an effective prelude
to this critique - extensive in its purview and graphically
detailed in its analysis.
Failure of verbal definitions
Can a common name say, ëdogí including the term
ëquadrupedí in its standard definition, be able to hook on
unfailingly to a single, detachable feature of fourleggedness
commonly shared by all the dogs? We have to detail out our
definitions, introduce sharper rules in terms of the specific
shape of the legs, the structure of the bones, the texture of
the hair on its legs, - in order to demarcate the
fourleggedness, say of a Dalmatian from that of a Doberman.
But even then, the respective bones Dalmatian1 and
Dalmatian2 may have different kinds of dents or undulations,
the texture of the hair in their legs may have different
degrees of smoothness or varying shades of colour The bone-
structures of Dalmatian1 and Dalmatian2 have to be further
analysed and specified as being similar in respect of another
feature or identity, say a common angle of bent at the mid-
joints, which again when shown to exhibit further individual
variations has to be analysed and specified to be similar in
respect of another identity, say ëYí. Whatever rules we may
specify, however we may detail out the features of similarity,
words will lead to words and to further words. This often
gives the impression that while reality itself is neat, round,
and smoothly bounded, it is language that is inadequate to
capture reality. Language is full of holes, cracks and crevices,
whatever words we use to plug these holes and cracks,
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themselves have fresh cracks ñ and so on. This way of looking
at things have naturally led philosophers to rely on ostensive
definitions as the last resort.
Failure of Ostensive Definitions
It is with very simple examples that ostensive definitions start
losing their sanctity. Pointing to a pencil, I may say ëThis is
toveí (BB p 2) (Wittgenstein deliberately chooses a fictitious
word which does not have a lexical meaning). This ostensive
definition can be variously interpreted to mean:
This is pencil
This is round
This is wood
This is one
This is hard, etc.
This is the angle of light
To go back to our example of Dalmatians, how can I point
to their common coat apart from the individual spot-patterns
that each Dalmatian has? How can I point to the common
texture of their hair apart from the varying degree of softness
or roughness? Suppose there are two or more Dalmatians
sitting in a sun-room, in different positions and postures,
the sun falling at different angles, and making a different
filigree of light and shade on the body of each. How will an
ostensive procedure be able to cut out their common
Dalmatian coat, except perhaps by being backed up by such
phrases like ìDo not look at the size, shape, number, or
configuration of black spots, just note that the dogs are all
white with black spots?î ìDo not look at the light and shade
effect on their body; just feel the texture of their hair.î Now
is there only one way of taking the words ëcolourí, ëlengthí,
or ëtextureí, ëblack and white spotsí, ëcoatí, or ëhairí? (PI
29). To take ëcolourí for instance, I point to a transparent
green glass on the table and then to the same glass painted
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in a picture on the wall, and say ëThis colour is greení. What
do I mean by ëcolourí in this case? Do I mean the colour in
the transparency, or the opaque green as painted on a
wooden door or as a pigment on the palette? On the first
alternative, the colour of the green glass and that of the
painted glass will not be the name, for it is the complex of
colour-patches that depicts the glass in the picture that is its
colour. The second alternative too has no greater prospect
of presenting a pure opaque green colour as a single object
of ostension. (Remarks on Colour, I 18) Colour takes different
dimensions, depths and hue depending on the thing that
has the colour and depending on its environment; one
cannot find a self identical saturated sample of green, or
white that can be captured by ostension. As Wittgenstein
observes in ROC I 61, ëWe are inclined to believe the analysis
of our colour concepts would lead ultimately to the colours of
places in our visual field, which are independent of any spatial
or physical interpretation; for here there is neither light
nor shadow, nor highlight, etc., etc. ...í Of the two
Dalmatians, I may see one as being white with black spots,
and the other black with white spots, putting black and white
alternatively in the background and foreground. Lights
falling on their body at different angles and different
intensity will produce tonal variations of white and grey on
the different parts of the body. There will be intractable
variations if the light happens to filter through curtains of
different colours. Difference in the sitting postures,
movement of muscles too cause subtle redistribution of
shades. A painter who depicts each of these dogs in his
characteristic posture and position with the individual light
and shade pattern of his body, has to use a different
combination of colours on his palette for each of them. The
ostensive definition along with the explanatory phrase ìLook
at the common white and black coatî will be of little help to
him.
Similar remarks would apply to the alternative modes of
identification with even stronger force. How would the
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islander pick out the characteristic feature of the boat-
building trees, say, the maturity of wood, girth of the trunk
in isolation from the colour of the wood, its thickness or
texture? To take Wittgensteinís own example in PI 47, how
can one alternately point to two exclusive features of the
tree ñ first to its broken outline composed of straight bits
and then to the complexity of its colours? Any ostensive
technique that may be adopted would lead to words, and
words to further ostension, and neither can be privileged as
the originary foundation.
Opacity of Acts of Ostension
The myth of bare particulars or of self-identical detachable
features out there in reality, waiting to be captured by proper
names, needed another myth of there being uniform acts
of putting labels on to each of these entities. On this view,
each of the acts - identifying colour as opposed to shape, or
shape as opposed to number or the angle of light exhibits a
characteristic essence. It just needs a little introspection to
expose the absurdity of such suppositions. We sometimes
attend to the colour by putting our hand up to keep the
outline from view, or by not looking at the outline of the
thing; sometime by staring at the object and trying to
remember where we saw the colour before. We identify the
shape sometimes by screwing up our eyes so as not to see
the colour clearly, and in many other ways. And even if there
were a characteristic process of attending to the shape ñ say,
following the outline with oneís finger or eyes, this by itself
would not constitute what we call identifying the shape in
contrast to its colour. (PI 33) It is weirder to talk of a single
act of identifying the common black and white coat of a
Dalmatian ñ an act which brushes away the variant effects of
light and shade, variant sizes and shapes and configurations
of their spots. Can it possibly be by screwing our eyes to have
a blurred image of black and white, which will, so to speak
abstract from individual variations in colour and spot-patterns?
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Such a blurred image which has rather stronger potentials
to throw out similarity-relations in numerous directions has
still less chance of catching a single detachable correlate.
Wittgenstein had further argued in PI 85 ñ ëDoes the
sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go?
Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed
it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country?
But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in
the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one? ñ
And if there were not a single sign-post, but a chain of
adjacent ones or of chalk-marks on the ground ñ is there
only one way of interpreting them?í There is not a single way
of interpreting a single act of pointing with the finger. I
cannot only read in the direction of the wrist to finger, or
from the finger to the wrist, but also in the direction in which
his knuckles move (i.e., upwards) ñ the direction in which a
sliver of sunlight falls on his palms, or even the direction in
which the hair stands on his arms. And whatever corrective
techniques he may adopt ñ rubbing his knuckles, flattening
out the bristles of his hair, patting my back every time I do it
in the ërightí way, putting a cross in the ëwrongí direction ñ
all these pictures are again available to innumerable ways of
reading. All ostensive procedures of identification are
pictures that are ruptured from within, they disseminate
into an unending flow of more and more words, and more
and more pictures.
Failure of inner ostension
For the Augustinians, the fact that verbal language and
gesture-language fail to capture a unique meaning only
shows that we need something stronger, something ëdeeperí
or ëinnerí, to effect the correlation between the word and
its self-identical meaning. They find it in the mental
imageries and internal acts of ëmeaningí or ëunderstandingí.
For them, while physical icons or acts of ostension may miss
WITTGENSTEIN ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 181
its target a mental ostension gets unfailingly hooked on its
unique meaning.
Here the Augustinians are obviously saddled with a
mental picture as a ësuper-likenessí or a super-picture which
makes it an image of this and of nothing else. (PI 389) They
need to appreciate the fact that like the physical picture, a
mental picture too, say of a white dog-skin with black spots
can be read in many different ways, it cannot by itself get
hooked on to its unique meaning-entity, the unique
Dalmatian coat, so to speak. Nor is there a mental act of
meaning or intending as a conscious process running
concurrently with the physical process of speaking. It may at
best reduce to an array of unspoken words, mouthed silently,
which plainly cannot have any magical quality to perform a
feat that a physically uttered sentence cannot. We cannot
hold up a single act or occurrence ñ whether mental or
physical ñ a characteristic ëfeelingí of meaning, a sincere
tone of voice, or an earnest facial expression ñ as a plausible
agent to do the trick.
Reference and Meaning: A Grammatical Interplay
It might be objected that the foregoing account shows a
failure of various devices in fixing meaning, not a failure of
ostensive definition in fixing reference. Pointing or ostending,
which by its very nature pins down a simple object, cannot
possibly pin down a complex property, a configuration or
arrangement of simples. Features like common texture of
hair, degrees of softness or roughness, broken outline
composed of straight bits, arrangement of colour-patches,
girth of wood, maturity of trunk, (marks of a tree alluded to
in a previous section) are on ultimate analysis configuration
of simples that are duly available to sophisticated version of
ostension (say Russellian acquaintance.) To whatever extent
Wittgenstein may experiment with deviant modes of
conception, he can at best introduce newer and newer
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modes of configuration; he cannot outgrow the logical
demands of ultimate simples underlying all possible modes
of deviance.
The way Wittgenstein breaks through this classical divide
between reference and description may be condensed
under the following points:
i) The difference between reference and description
consists in an interactive play ñ where the referring game
is the mere preparatory move (like putting pieces on
the board) and descriptions comprise of more elaborate
and complex activities.
ii) However, learning the games of referring are by no
means achieved through a transparent encounter with
putatively given objects. This simple or elementary
character of the referring games is relative ñ relative to
that particular simple/complex interplay in which it is
embodied. The elementary move of referring in one
game can figure as quite a sophisticated and complex
move of description in another game.
iii) In other words simplicity and complexity are not absolute
in Wittgensteinís philosophy. The constant meta-
morphosis of simple into complex and vice versa also
breaks through the claims of unique analysis and ultimate
terminus of analysis popularized in logical atomism.
iv) Thus reference is constructed in and through the uses,
the referred object does not pre-exist as a given chunk
to make the referring use possible We shall try to argue
that even within each of these naming-describing
interplays the reference never pre-exists but fleshes out
in and through each description.
Wittgenstein points out that the Augustinian model of
reference and description stands on a par with taking each
letter of a script to stand for a particular sound, or as signs of
emphasis or marks of punctuation. On this conception the
particular language or script turns out to be merely a
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description of sound-patterns along with their various modes
of intonation and punctuation. Or to take another example:
a person completely innocent of the intricate mechanism
of a locomotive will equate all the levers ñ the switch, crank,
brake, pump - with their external projections jutting out
from various parts of the cabin and all looking alike.( PG 20,
also PI 4) So far as the builderís assistant simply fetches
specific building materials viz. slab, blocks etc., at the call of
the builder ( PI 2), so far as he does not know how to operate
with the inner structure or composition of each of the
building stones, or to integrate them into a continuous
structure, he is at the rudiments of the entire process of
building. The operations of all these persons will not go
beyond passive assortments of the parts (of language,
machine or the building).
Wittgenstein himself has mentioned these games as
referringñgames along with a few others:
i. The teacher utters the words in the course of
ostensive teaching, pointing alongside to the relevant objects.
( PI 6)
ii. The teacher calls out names like ëchairí, ëtableí,
ëplateí, ësofaí, ëchessboardí and the child is taught to touch
the relevant object. (We construct this game on the model
of the above.)
iii. One memorises words and their meanings. (PI 47)
iv. A word is uttered and the subject is asked to recall
the image of the corresponding object. (PI 6)
v. Putting pieces on the board before playing. (PI 49)
The point of these examples is to harp on the preparatory
or rudimentary character of reference vis a vis the complex
activity of description with the all important reminder that
they are not preparations for a passive combination into
descriptions. Thus the flaw in the Augustinian model of
language is exposed to be on the same footing with such
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theories that envisage language-speaking or other activities
as comprising of two primary functions ñ first the elementary
move of gathering materials, and second, the act of passively
assorting these inert chunks. It is strange why Wittgenstein
seems to be quite content in characterizing the Augustinian
model of language as merely an error of omission.
ëAugustine, we may say, does describe a system of
communication; only not everything that we call this
language is this system...it is appropriate, but only for this
narrowly circumscribed region... .í It is like defining ëgameí
as consisting in moving objects about on a surface according
to certain rules, thus restricting oneself only to board-games
leaving out the others.(PI 3, also see 2, 4. ) In PG 19, (p. 57)
he qualifies the simplicistic nature of Augustinian model:
ëSo it could be said that Augustine represents the matter
too simply; but also that he represents something simpler.í
The first move would be like restricting oneself only to say,
board-games, the second move would be like stopping short
at putting pieces in the board.
It is quite evident that these game of putting the pieces
on board, fetching building materials, linking each letter
with only denoting a sound - in so far as they have no tendency
to move to the actual steps of playing, to the intricate stages
of construction, or to using a set of signs as representing not
sound-patterns but full-bodied reality - they cannot even be
called simpler games in any sense. The simplicity of these
so-called simple moves can only be appreciated in so far as
they do not remain as truncated fragments but are seen as
incorporated into the full-fledged games. And the way the
simple is incorporated into the complex, or reference is
incorporated into description is obviously not through a
passive assortment but in a dynamic interplay of an extremely
complex nature.
To grow out of this passive assortment or linear
combination-model is to grow out of the absolute distinction
of the simple and the complex and purportedly unique
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modes of analysis popularized by Logical Atomism.(PI 46-
49) A chair can be seen as made of bits of wood, or of atoms
and molecules, or (normally) as composed of a back-rest
and seat propped up on four legs, or as a unitary design
resisting any analysis (PI 47). The visual image of this tree
can be looked upon as a complex of colour patches, or as a
broken outline composed of straight bits. A curved line can
be said to be composed of an ascending segment and a
descending segment. A chessboard is normally seen as a
unique composition made out of thirty two white and thirty
two black squares. But we can also see it as colours black and
white and a schema of squares. There is no inherent
simplicity in the respective elements of each mode of
complexity, say, of the chessboard. ëIs the colour of a square
of a chessboard simple, or is it composed of pure white and
pure yellow? And is white simple or does it consist of colours
of the rainbow? Is this length 2 cm simple or does to consist
of 1 bit 3 cm long and one bit 1 cm long measured in the
opposite direction?í (PI 47). ëIs it unimaginable for someone
to see the group | | | | | (e.g.) as the group | | || | | with
the two middle strokes fused, and should accordingly count
the middle stroke twice? (True, it is not the usual case)í
(RFM I 168). ëThe question ìIs what you see composite?î
makes good sense if it is already established what kind of
complexity - that is, which particular use of the word - is in
question.í Asking ìIs the object composite?î outside a
particular language-game is like asking whether the verb
ëto sleepí meant something active or passive. (PI 47). The
phenomenon of seeing a tree for example in different ways
can be accounted for in two ways: Either we are baptising
the entire tree say by the proper name ëTerryí in which case
ëTerryí can internalize its reference in so many different
ways (two of which we have already cited). On the other
hand we can also say that we are not baptising the tree, but
baptising each of its so-called elements. To take another
example: Suppose there are some squares of different
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colours like red, green, white and black arranged like a
chessboard. We can have the words, R, G, W, B
corresponding to these squares and a sentence say
ëRRBGGGRWWí describing an arrangement of this sort (PI
48).
Here the sentence above is a complex of names and thus a
description of the configuration of the squares. But none of
the squares which figure as names in this usage is inherently
simple, in other language-games each of them can be said
to be a composite, consisting perhaps of two rectangles,
colours and shapes. Thus what is a name ëRí in this context,
may well be a description or a sentence describing the
configurations of two rectangles, in another context. To say
that we cannot define or describe certain elements but
simply name them will only mean a limiting case where a
complex consists of one square. Here its description seems
to give the illusion of being the name of the colored square.
Similarly the above expression RRBGGGRWW can embody
a preparatory referring move in a game where the entire
figure taken as a single unit enters into certain relations or
interactions with other similar figures.
Adopting this track of argument it will be easy to
appreciate that the block, pillars, slabs etc. can be looked
upon as a complex of colour-patches (where the sub-atomic
cohesion into a hard impenetrable chunk is kept out of the
purview), or as pattern of light and shade, and so on. So the
builderís assistant in playing out the referring game of
fetching the building-blocks in the customary fashion is only
exercising a simplicity that is relative in at least two senses.
First, playing this referring-game the assistant is already
R R B
G G G
R W W
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embedded (though in an imperfect and incomplete
fashion)into the activity of building which opts out of the
other two kinds of games just mentioned. Playing the
referring ñ games in the other two modes for instance would
have incurred different modes of activity ñ scraping it into
layers of different chromes and lumping them together in a
single compact pile, and placing each block in the same
relative position with the sun and the shadow. (These
referring games will throw up the more complex games of
descriptions - say of comparing two stones in terms of the
variety of shades that each comprises of, or uniting one light
and shade pattern with another.) On similar lines, the
customary referring game of the builderís assistant can be
recast into an appreciably complex, sophisticated and
elaborate game of description - the assistant taking note of
how each utterance of the builder hits on his ears, tracing
the movement of his limbs in lifting the slab, the
configuration of his arms and the building materials, pattern
of muscular tension in carrying the materials. Such activities
form the assumed backdrop and not the substantial content of
the referring game played by the assistant. As Strawson9
pointed out, stating that one is making a referring use or
stating the conditions under which he is making it, forms
no part of the significance of referring-games. However,
when the simple game of the assistant is recast in a complex
game of describing (in the manner indicated), some suitably
simple move of referring ( i.e. referring to oneís limbs,
muscles, etc) crops up to even the balance. The relation
between reference and description is a pattern of contrastive
interplay where though there is a constant switch-over of
roles, it perhaps never permits a disturbance in the basic
requirement of a dual tension. One can undertake similar
exercises of transforming the other games of referring
narrated in (i) to (v) into descriptions and thus recasting
the pattern of each simple-complex interplay.
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Reference as ëShowní in multiple fashions
Reference turns out not to be a singular pre-semantic
encounter with a simple object lying out there, nor is
meaning or understanding achieved by a compact set of
statements drawing from the supposed transparency of verbal
rules and definite descriptions. Both these phenomena
spread out in a plethora of linguistic and non-linguistic
activities, spilling over the present to ëa variety of actions
and experiences of different kinds before and afterí. (BB
p. 145 and also PI 35). We have seen that while with reference
these activities recede to the background, meaning spreads
out in explicit statements and explanations.
Wittgenstein says that the referring game of ostension
cannot take off unless the ëoverall role of the word in
language is clearí. (PI 30) One cannot offer or respond to
an ostensive definition, say of a chess-piece unless one is
already initiated into games, the specific variety of board-
games, the conventions of moving the pieces around the
board. The sortals that often come to accompany ostensive
definitions, like ëcolourí, ëshapeí, ëlengthí indeed show the
ëgrammarí, the ëpost at which we station the wordí.(PI 29)
But this does not imply that grammar is uniquely ëshowní as
the reference presupposed by all actual and possible
descriptions, in the manner that the unique and ultimate
logical form of all language was claimed to be ëshowní in the
Tractatus. (4.121, 4.1212, also NB p107) The later
Wittgensteinís leanings towards multiple ways of shownness
surface in such statements that there is no ëone way of taking
the word ìcolourî or ìlengthî í, and any attempt to
disambiguate them through definitions will go on ad
infinitum.(PI 29) .Similarly there is no one way in which the
alternative grammars of a chessboard or the tree are to be
taken. Alternative or deviant grammars do not entail but
themselves flesh out bit by bit through deviant descriptions
just as in the case of the normal ones.
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The idea of a pre-linguistic, primordial referent that
foreshadows all possible descriptions is indeed hard to resist.
Kripke says that baptism captures the necessary identity of a
particular as originating from a particular stuff ñ the material
stuff like the specific pieces of wood in case of a table, and
the eggs and sperms of the parents in case of a human
individual10. Now the question is what the referential identity
of the parents is, and the gametes which according to Kripke
are supposed to recur in all counterfactuals stipulated about
the referent? Any attempt to pin it down by ostension or
further definite description would launch a patently
indefinite regress. And the identityñconditions cannot hark
back on the original reference (the human individual in
question) on pain of obvious circularity. This clearly shows
that each renewed recognition of an individual as the same
reference of the proper name is not linear addition to the
given transworld identity; rather each preceding stage of
the individual is reshaped and enriched by the subsequent
ones11.
Equipped with these fresh insights we can now venture
a more imaginative treatment of PI 66. The examples of
ëgamesí and ëfamilyí were strategically deployed to show how
the phenomenon of external ruptures gives way to internal
ruptures. Let us recall the statement: ëLook at the parts
played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill
in chess and skill in tennis.í It does not merely show how a
property viz. skill gets replaced by the property of luck, or
how the property of ëskill in chessí drops out to make way
for ëskill in tennisí, but how the property of skill itself breaks
open to dissolve the very dichotomy between a property and
a particular, i.e., between description and reference. This is
another way to see similarity or resemblance in a new light ñ
not as grounded upon non-relational ërespectsí or features
or identities that foreshadow different routes of similarity-
relations. To learn the reference or meaning of a particular
word, through ostension or definition, one has already gone
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through a vast, complicated and indefinite network of
relations ñ similarity relations without a non-relational respect.
Shorn of these ërespectsí, i.e., ostensible common features,
and also of unique and unfailing acts of ostension, the
concepts used in our language, as well as the concept of
language itself turn out to be a motley of language-games,
behaviours and practices, without any common structure or
content. ëInstead of producing something common to all
that we call language, I am saying . . . that they are related to
one another in many different ways. It is because of this
relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all
ìlanguageîí. (PI 65) The italic emphasis on ërelatedí is
indeed designed to wean us away from the non-relational
identity, the foundational core of relations.
Failure of measurement as ostending to a quantitative identity
Do all these reference/description patterns rest on a
uniform quantitative boundary? Is there a single chunk of
an object on which we play out all these modes of simple-
complex interactions? Wittgensteinís examples on various
modes of simplicity (and the further contrivances we have
attempted in those lines) seek to swerve from such
constraints. Yet some of Wittgensteinís statements in
connection with the teaching of words like ëslabí are a bit
problematic: ëThis ostensive teaching of words can be said
to establish an association between the word and the thingí...
[I]t may mean various things: but one very likely thinks first
of all that a picture of the object comes before the childís
mind when he hears the word.í(PI 6, italics mine) Also in
the course of dissipating any putative essence shared by the
acts of ostension, Wittgenstein says: ëOnly think how
differently we learn the use of words ìto point to this thingî,
ìto point to that thingî, and on the other hand ìto point to
the colour, not the shapeî, ìto mean the colourî and so on.í
(PI 35) Is Wittgenstein dismissing a global essence supposedly
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shared by all acts of ostension (pointing to things, colour,
shape etc.) at the cost of admitting a local essence shared by
all acts of pointing to a thing? Does this mean that pointing
to one thing as distinct from others harks back on a readily
available quantitative chunk of an object which is absent in
pointing to colours or shapes?
Now we may argue that instead of suggesting a quanti-
tative identity easily available for reference Wittgenstein is
suggesting that the numerical identification of things is not
simply given, but a game we have to learn through an
elaborate ostensive programming. One cannot point to a
piece in a game as a piece in a game, similarly one cannot
point to a thing as a countable object numerically distinct
from another through a single and transparent act of
ostension. Nor can reference be determined through
measurement. A little reflection will show that a measuring
scale fares no better than physical or inner ostension. Any
attempt to pin down a fixed originary moment of complete
identification ñ be it with ostension, or rational intuition, or
measurement ñ will produce an endless regress of origins.
In the first place let us recall that to identify an object say as
ëblueí through ostension, we must already have identified it
as having some feature, coloured, shaped, or hard, etc.
Similarly to put the measuring scale against the object one
needs to identify the two points within which the object lies,
i.e., to have already determined its quantity. Secondly, we
also need to identify the beginning and end-point of the
measuring scale, which cannot be further decided by
another scale without repeating the problem. Similarly we
also need to conceptualise the ostensive procedure itself ñ
as an act of pointing with the finger, or a movement of the
eye-ball, or a mental image. Thirdly, the comparison between
the measuring device and the measured object can no more
be decided by measurement, than the comparison between
the ostender and the ostended be decided by ostension.
Whether the act of pointing be matched up with the table
192 ENAKSHI MITRA
lying in the direction of the finger, or with the bed lying in
the direction of the wrist, or whether the mental image of
the ashtray be matched up with purple colour of the actual
ashtray lying in front, or with its oval shape, cannot be passed
over to further ostensious. Measurement too would involve
at least two more identifications ñ (a) Coinciding the left
end of the object with that point of the scale from which
the markers begin, and (b) Determining the two marks of
the scale between which the right end of the object lies.12
Thus the limits of an object, the coincidence of points, their
relative position ñ in short reference ñ is presupposed and
not decided by measurement.
It seems that Wittgenstein does not want to retain the
quantitative identity of the thing on which the different
games are built, or the different modes of understanding
are effected. Rather it may reasonably be held that his view
of the dialectic interplay between the simple and complex
also breaks through absolute distinction between the small
and the large ñ of determinate quantitative boundaries where
the large is supposed to be built out of the small static units
through a process of linear addition. Wittgenstein points
out that expressions like ëdivision of a line by a point outside
ití, and ëcomposition of forcesí clearly show that sometimes
we tend to look upon a greater area as composed by a
division of the smaller and a smaller area as composed of
greater area. (PI 48) The second example brings an
interesting analogy between matter and meaning into play.
Neither matter nor meaning should be looked upon as a
composite, tightly packed up with hard little balls or absolute,
simple elements. Matter is to be conceived as a swarm of
electrical particles, widely separated from each other and
rushing about in great speed ñ thus creating a network or
field of forces. The particles are not inert little balls, resting
smugly in an equally inert, external and empty space. They
are forces which can be said to occupy space only by buffeting
away anything that tries to enter. Thus they are not in space,
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they create space, they are space. And in this sense they create
a ëcomposition of forcesí, where the smaller area can be
said to be composed out of greater areas. One cannot look
upon matter or meaning as assorted out of smaller elements
inertly adding up to progressively larger ones, for the smaller
can only be understood as exploding into or creating bigger
space. Reference does not hark back on an inert, simple
quantitative identity underlying all modes of descriptions;
but the way in which that putative identity is invaded by its
other ñ the space of description.
Language, Behaviour and Reality
What we have been trying to appreciate is that reference,
meaning and understanding consist in a plethora of activities,
which cannot be conceived in any fashion unless they are
seen to incorporate the reality into themselves, very much
in the same fashion as the mechanisms of a locomotive absorb
their seemingly external projections. (PG 20, PI 4) The acts
of uttering marks, writing signs or moving oneís limbs
traditionally presuppose an immaculate object waiting out
there to be somehow linked, manipulated or maneuvered
by these acts. The Nyaya-Vaisesikas conceive behaviour or
actions as a cause of conjunction or disjunction ñ say the act
of my walking away from this room to the next causes a
disjunction from one part of space and conjunction with
another part13 (space figuring as an eternal and all-
pervading substance for this school). On this theory behaviors
or actions are envisaged as bridges conjoining the agent with
the object ñ the two entities lying external to each other.
For Wittgenstein on the other hand behaviour does not
connect signs with the signified by making a bridge through
a supposed empty space in between. We have to appreciate
how it constructs the sign and the signified into a new space.
Conceiving the chair and my body in the normal fashion
amounts to bridging them up in the usual way ñ sticking out
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my limbs to it or fixing a plank between the two. But if I
conceive a chair as an amalgamation of pieces bereft of its
normal function it may be loosened up into a horizontal
chain reaching up to my body. Again to conceive the chair
as an assortment of streaks or colour-patches is to create
another new space ñ a spread of wooden strips, each with a
different streak or a different shade. Conceiving both my
body and the chair as certain designs or as composition of
forces will invoke newer bridges creating newer spaces.
Indeed to build a bridge literally between the two banks of
the river is to carve out a new space, it does not fill up the
supposed empty space yawning between the two pre-given
banks so to speak. The new space that our bridge creates
serves our purpose best, but it has no theoretical power to
block other constructs. The multiple ways of bridging do
not follow from a specific conception of the object, but in
each case the object is fleshed out in and through the bridge.
The next step is to realize how the non-linguistic
behaviours ( absorbing our body and objects into a new
space) get sophisticated and extended into linguistic
behaviours, viz. the action of uttering sounds by different
parts of our speech-organ. Dead phonemes and their
combinations do not constitute language, it is the active
utterances of these sounds, the movement of the speech-
organ, movement of facial muscles, gestures with our eyes
and limbs ñ all imbued with images and feelings ñ that our
non-linguistic behaviours extend to. Once language is seen
as an extension of non-linguistic behaviours it can be seen as
internalizing reality in the way behaviours do.
Initially it will be easier to trace out pain-language as an
extension of pain-behaviour before we can readily
appreciate language in general as an extension of non-
linguistic behaviours. Pain-expressions are neither names nor
descriptions of pain-sensations delinked from common
public space with common public coordinates. Any
expression purporting to name, directly or indirectly (i.e.,
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through an intermediary of a private description) a private
referent i.e., a private feeling of pain has to invoke words
from the public vocabulary i.e., use a public bridge or link
to the putatively private sensation. But a private feeling
claimed to reside on the other side of the public bridge
cannot retain its professed privacy. Thus pain-behaviors,
whether overt or covert, are not external manifestations,
but exhaust the entire substance of our ëinnerí feelings and
emotions ñ nothing of our inner world remains as an
irreducibly pure content untouched by actual behaviors. (PI
243-315)14 We deliberately refrain from invoking ëpossibleí
behaviours in this context for a sensation resting on
unrealized possibility of behavioural manifestation lapses into
the same absurdity Wittgenstein is trying to avoid. This view
also steers clear of the behaviourist position and
demonstrates pain-language as not a description, but an
extension of pain-behaviour. Interestingly behaviorism itself
turns out to be a version of the Augustinian model taking
signs and physical behaviours as mutually external ñ words
being names of behavioral items, which are combined into
sentences or descriptions. Further, behaviourism itself fails
to make the desired connection between language (the
word ëpainí) on the one hand and pain-behaviours on the
other (the purported meaning of signs.) The bridge of
physical ostension which for the behaviourists is the only
resource available, does not withstand the critique of
Augustinian model. For Wittgenstein, language does not
name or describe behaviour but itself is behaviour, it does
not represent meaning but is itself the meaning.
This equation of language and behaviour will be patently
opposed to the Fregean standpoint where understanding
or speaking is to apprehend non-sensible thoughts residing
in the third realm - thoughts that just happen to get clothed
in the sensible garb of signs. Frege will put signs, behaviours
or actions as physical events in the first realm. Meaning for
Frege involves an ëintention to representí (i.e., intention to
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be true of) which can conceivably belong only to thought.
Behaviours and actions cannot perform this function of
meaning, it is the thought viz. ëThese behaviours and actions
represent this reality (truly or falsely)í that needs to be
invoked to account for meaning and communication.15 For
Wittgenstein on the other hand, there are no pre-
interpretive and absolute ëthoughtsí in the third realm that
enters into the sensible garb of signs or generate the non-
linguistic behaviours. Rather it is the non-linguistic instinctive
behaviours that get their sophisticated extension and
replacement into the utterance of signs and sets the pattern
of a thought.(Z, 541,545)16
This internal blend of language, behaviour and reality
get effectively reinforced in Wittgensteinís reflections on
the notion of understanding. For him understanding cannot
take us from signs to extra linguistic reality (Russell), or from
signs to transparent sign-independent thoughts in the third
realm (Frege). Understanding is rather moving from a
relatively strange set of signs to an easily surveyable
symbolism.(PG p 40) In understanding a musical piece we
are never expected to learn or be able to say what it is all
about, what is crucially involved is rather understanding why
these bars should be played in this way, why the pattern of
variation of loudness should be just like this. Understanding
music is translating a musical picture to a picture in another
medium. Similar remarks apply to understanding a
proposition which is virtually understanding a picture. (PG
p 41)
The difference between understanding a picture and
not understanding it is internal to the picture itself. To survey
these two cases of ënot understanding a pictureí
a. I do not understand the pictureí. ñ I say this when I am
not able to envisage the flat colours as going out of itself
to represent anything.
b. ëI do not understand the pictureí. - I say this when
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though I am able to see it in its representational aspect I
am not able to identify what reality it is supposed to
represent.
In neither of the above cases the failure to understand the
picture is the failure to go beyond the picture to an external
reality. Likewise, the success in understanding the picture
is also internal to the picture. Similarly the failure or success
in understanding a proposition is internal to the sign-system
that constitutes the proposition. (PG p 42 )
Had signs been an inessential garb of reality and
understanding been a passage from one to the other, then
one could easily have replaced any word in a sentence by
any other. E.g. ëI see a black patch thereí can successively be
replaced by a, b, c, d, e, f. ( PG p 44) The fact that we cannot
make this substitution shows that the meaning of ëIí is not a
piecemeal entity which previously linked with the isolated
phonetic content of ëIí now needs to be linked to another
sign. It shows that ëIí has spilled over its phonetic bounds to
absorb other words and contexts into a full-fledged reality.
As the replacement of ëIí by ëaí cannot replace these rich
layers of association ë[we] cannot think the sense of the above
sentence straightaway in the new expressioní.
This relentless and tortuous grapple with foundations
rules out all possibility of reading Wittgenstein as presenting
a theory of socio-cultural relativism, where different modes
of conception are different ways of permuting and
combining a given set of pre-social identities. While the talk
of ëcustomsí, ëinstitutionsí and ëforms of lifeí (PI 198-
199,205,337, RFM I-63 ) temporarily shifts the focus to socio-
cultural factors, they are in the long run, strategic reminders
that one cannot find a starting point or origin where all
explanations end, but that one can only spread out the whirl
of organism in a progressively enriched and full-bodied
expanse.
On ultimate analysis, language, behaviour and reality
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cannot be externalized from and yet expected to entail each
other through a logical mechanism. Such foundationalist
ambitions may be paralleled with that of freezing the ocean-
waves a moment before they break and then professing to
extract the crushed expanse of the foams of its frozen
reservoir. It is extremely important to realize that behaviour
itself as a pure reference severed from all uses and behaviours
ironically lapses into the ghostly fragment ñ an iron rod
severed from the entire mechanism, ëwhen language is like
an engine idling, not when it is doing work. (PI 132) While
meaning cashes out into linguistic and non-linguistic
behaviours, behaviour itself is not a pre-behavioral chunk
given out there. Thus in fine language and behaviour forge
a non-foundational blend that internalizes and does not
represent the supposedly extra-linguistic reality.
 NOTES
1. The abbreviations used for Wittgensteinís texts are as follows: The Blue
and the Brown Books (BB), Notebooks (NB), Philosophical Investigations (PI),
Philosophical Grammar (PG), Remarks on Colour, (ROC), Remarks on
Foundations of Mathematics (RFM), Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (TLP),
Zettel (Z).
2. I have been obliged to borrow many examples from John Hospers, An
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis for their wonderful variety and
simplicity.
3. Lewis Caroll, Aliceís Adventures in Wonderland, Wordsworth Classics, Great
Britain, 2001, p 136.
4. We shall have to submit at the end that Wittgenstein is not offering a
sociological foundation of language.
5. See R. Bambrough, ëUniversals and Family Resemblanceí, George
Pitcher (ed.), Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, pp. 202 ñ 203.
6. This theory is propounded by Russell in his Philosophy of Logical Atomism,
Logic And Knowledge, R.C.Marsh (ed.) Routledge And New York, 1994.
7. I acknowledge the influence of Baker and Hackerís treatment of this
issue (Baker and Hacker, 1980, volume 1, p. 33, p. 45 ñ 59)
8. Frege states this quite explicitly in ëSinn und Bedeutungí, ëThe Thought:
A Logical Enquiryí in Michael Beaney (ed), The Frege Reader.
9. ëOn Referringí, in R. Ammerman (ed), Classics of Analytic Philosophy.
10. Naming and Necessity, Lecture III, p 112 ñ 114.
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11. Kripke holds that the concept of reference or reality is too rich to be
specified in terms of anything else (ostension or definite description)
and thus all circularities or regresses involved in specifying the identity-
conditions of an individual only shows the inadequacy of language in
capturing reality. This view as we have noted is flatly opposed to
Wittgensteinís. On the other hand, Kripkeís emphatic rejection of a
tertium quid (ostension or definite description) for reaching out to
reference brings him closer to Wittgenstein in certain respects. However,
for Kripke the referent causes the usage of rigid designators and repeats
itself as a unique transworld identity in all descriptions. For Wittgenstein
on the other hand, language internalizes reference in inexhaustively
different ways.
12. This analysis of measurement is derived largely from R.S. Jones, Physics
as Metaphor, pp. 18 ñ 30.
13. Prasastapada Bhasyam, Part I,5.
14. I am greatly indebted to C.E.M. Dunlopís ìWittgenstein on Sensation
and Seeing Asî in Synthese for the treatment of pain.
15. Frege, Gottlob, ëThe Thought: A Logical Enquiryí.
16. Norman Malcolmís article ëThe Relation of Language to Instinctive
Behaviourí has helped me shape up this line of argument.
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